Cambridge Law Journal 版面费-刊鹿论文编译

Research Handbook on Fiduciary Law. Edited by D. Gordon Smith and Andrew S. Gold. [Cheltenham and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018. xviii + 448 pp. Hardback £180. ISBN 978-01-78471-482-6.]

Abstract:

Research Handbook is the latest instalment in a series of edited volumes devoted to fiduciary law, reflecting burgeoning scholarly interest in this field. The editors’ vision is ambitious, to draw from principles developed “in varied relationship contexts over hundreds of years” in order to “unify the study of fiduciary law as a distinctive field”. As a starting point in this quest, the volume has achieved astounding success. The book is organised around a comprehensive framework that explores both the internal components of fiduciary law (its theories, obligations, and remedies) and the external terrains in which it operates or may operate (corporations, comparative law and public governance). Each of these parts engages with cutting edge issues in the field, and in doing so sheds light on topics for further inquiry, just as one would hope to see in a research handbook. A few examples suffice. The first part on theories seeks to define the fiduciary concept and provide novel explanations of the distinctively moralistic fiduciary rules. Velasco defines the fiduciary relationship as involving the substitutive exercise of legal capacity over the significant practical interests of the principal, whether it arises in jure through the principal’s appointment or de facto when the fiduciary’s influence amounts to effective control. The emphasis on substitutive capacity crucially distinguishes fiduciary relationships from relationships of influence, and helps tackle heated debates as to whether and when advisers, friends and parents can be fiduciaries. The other theoretical chapters seek to justify strict fiduciary duties (the conduct rules) and the more deferential standard of review of fiduciary discretion (the decision rules). Harding argues that fiduciary norms perform a signalling function as to the content of the norms around which parties can build trust and reliance in the fiduciary relationship. The signalling function itself does not explain why the content of the rule is the way it is, nor is it unique to fiduciary rules, but it complements the deterrence rationale behind them. Criddle invokes republican political theory to argue that the combination of strict conduct rules and deferential decision rules is designed to protect the beneficiary and fiduciary from domination by the arbitrary exercise of power. Taking a broader standpoint beyond moral and political theory, Gold observes that law and economics conceptions of loyalty have now been incorporated into fiduciary law, and calls for adjustment of the view that fiduciary law is strongly coherent with morality. A common feature of these three chapters is the authors’ willingness to go beyond familiar accounts of deterrence or the assertion that fiduciary profits are accountable because they arise from the fiduciary relationship as an accounting relationship. In doing so, they push the theoretical boundaries of our understanding of the subject. In the next two parts on obligations and remedies, we see further engagement with the nature and justification of fiduciary obligations, this time from a wider range of angles. The chapters on fiduciary obligations deal with: pragmatic concerns to overcome information asymmetry in the fiduciary relationship (Licht); the social and legal contexts of the proscriptive / prescriptive interpretations of fiduciary duty (Bainbridge); the uneven prophylactic operation of the no-profit rule across the contexts in which it operates (Kim); the view of fiduciary duties as involving the adoption of the principal’s goals and ends as one’s own (Laby); and the divergence between the concept of loyalty in fiduciary law and that found in morality (Miller). The two chapters on fiduciary remedies tackle new frontiers not yet fully explored in England and common law jurisdictions generally, but have become 220 [2019] The Cambridge Law Journal

Author Listing： Lusina Ho

Volume： 78

Pages： 220-222

DOI： 10.1017/S0008197319000254

Language： English

Journal： Cambridge Law Journal

Cambridge Law Journal

CAMB LAW J

影响因子：1.5

是否综述期刊：否

是否OA：是

是否预警：不在预警名单内

发行时间：-

ISSN：0008-1973

发刊频率：-

收录数据库：Scopus收录

出版国家/地区：-

出版社：Cambridge University Press

期刊介绍

年发文量	17
国人发稿量	1
国人发文占比	5.88%
自引率	6.7%
平均录取率	-
平均审稿周期	-
版面费	US$3255
偏重研究方向	LAW-
期刊官网	-
投稿链接	-

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研究类文章占比	OA被引用占比	撤稿占比	出版后修正文章占比
94.12%	46.48%	0.00%	0.00%

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